The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia by Hinerfeld, Olivia
Portland State University
PDXScholar
Young Historians Conference Young Historians Conference 2013
May 2nd, 9:00 AM - 10:15 AM
The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia
Olivia Hinerfeld
St Mary's Academy
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/younghistorians
Part of the European History Commons
This Event is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Young Historians Conference by an authorized administrator
of PDXScholar. For more information, please contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu.
Olivia Hinerfeld, "The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia" (May 2, 2013). Young Historians Conference. Paper 6.
http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/younghistorians/2013/oralpres/6
The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
   Olivia Hinerfeld 
     Prof. Vannelli 
    Hon. Modern European History 
                  March 11, 2013 
																																																																																																																																										Hinerfeld	
	 	
1
Olivia Hinerfeld 
PSU Hst/ Hon. Modern European History 
Mr. Vannelli 
March 11, 2013 
The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia 
In the last century, one nation achieved an incredible rise to power and 
devastating collapse in the span of mere decades. Yugoslavia—a now nonexistent 
country—flourished under the influential leadership of Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980). 
Before Tito came into power, Yugoslavia experienced a variety of governmental 
structures. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was established in 1918, only to be substituted in 
1943 by the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia. Just three years later, the Federal People’s 
Republic of Yugoslavia was proclaimed, which was eventually replaced by the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1963. Named Prime Minister in 1943, Tito entered 
politics at a unique time in the nation’s history; as Yugoslavia shifted from a monarchy to 
a federation, he became one of the country’s biggest advocates for a communist style of 
government. At the time he became Prime Minister, World War II was coming to a close 
and communism had become characterized by the concentration of power in Moscow. A 
visionary leader, Tito believed in empowering a plurality of independent centers of 
political authority. Consequently, the Yugoslavs defected from the communist bloc in 
1948. This pluralistic worldview carried over into Tito’s leadership of Yugoslavia itself. 
Consisting of six national republics and two autonomous regions, Tito was able to unify 
these disparate people into one communist entity. Elected President in 1953, Tito went on 
to rule over Yugoslavia until his death in 1980. In his thirty-seven years as leader of 
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Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito instituted a policy of “polycentrism” which unified the 
culturally diverse people; however, upon his death, the policy collapsed due to the 
ineffective leadership of the collective presidency, economic troubles, and ethno-
religious unrest, resulting in the country’s disintegration. 
In order to protect Yugoslavia from the influence of major world powers, Tito 
introduced a policy in which the nation opted to remain neutral amidst worldwide 
conflicts. Known as the Non-Alignment Movement, the policy was largely brought into 
effect largely in response to the United States conflict with the Soviet Union in the Cold 
War. As the nuclear arms race between the two world powers intensified, Tito expressed 
concern about becoming involved. Upon initiating the policy of neutrality, Tito decided 
to host the first “Conference of Non-Aligned Heads of State.” The conference took place 
in Belgrade in 1961 and had twenty-five countries represented. The second conference 
occurred in Cairo in 1964, with forty-seven countries represented.1 These conferences 
bore great significance, as they demonstrated Tito’s growing influence on other nations in 
the world.	Fortunately for Tito, because the conflicts between the two United States and 
Soviet Union never escalated from the Cold War to full-scale war, Yugoslavia was able 
to maintain its policy of Non-Alignment. However, the weakness of the policy became 
apparent in that it was based on “Tito’s personality cult” and “great prestige abroad” as 
opposed to the “political and economic strength of the system itself.”2 Indeed, Tito’s 
unique leadership made it possible for the Non-Alignment Movement to begin in 
Yugoslavia, posing threats to major world powers. The United States and the Soviet 
																																																								
1		“The	Non‐Aligned	Movement:	Description	and	History,”	Non‐Aligned	Movement,	last	modified	Sep.	
21,	2001,	http://www.nam.gov.za/background/history.htm.	
2	Slobodan	Stankovic,	The	End	of	the	Tito	Era:	Yugoslavia’s	Dilemmas	(California:	Hoover	Institution	
Press,	1981),	104‐105.	 
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Union viewed Yugoslavia as a menace; its rapid economic growth and rising population 
were beginning to establish it as a forthcoming world authority. Nevertheless, the Non-
Alignment Movement was not the only reason these nations felt threatened by 
Yugoslavia.		
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was formally comprised of six 
republics—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and 
Serbia—and two autonomous regions, Kosovo and Vojvodina. Within these eight 
constituencies, three religions predominated: Orthodox Christianity, Roman Catholicism, 
and Islam. Yugoslavia officially recognized two alphabets, both Cyrillic and Roman.3 
Through a policy of “polycentrism,” Tito successfully unified these notably distinct 
republics into one federation. For many years, Yugoslavia aligned itself with the Soviet 
Union. However, after Tito came into power, he sought to distance the nation from the 
center of Communist rule. He believed that in the USSR “a man [was] a number, and the 
people a colorless mass which must docilely obey and fulfill all the orders of their 
leaders.”4 Thus, Yugoslavia disassociated itself from the Communist bloc in 1948. To 
Stalin’s dismay, the Yugoslav Communist Party stayed in power and continued on as 
before, not falling to capitalism as the Soviets predicted. The federation’s success in this 
regard caused other Communist rulers to question the merits of obedience to the Soviet 
Union.5 Tito’s model gave Communist countries a “far wider area of choice” in shaping 
both their “relationship to the non-Communist world” as well as “internal institutions and 
policies.”6 As Yugoslavia flourished, the absurdity of “the Kremlin contention that their 
																																																								
3	“Josip	Broz	Tito,”	Economic	and	Political	Weekly	15,	No.	19	(May	10,	1980):	829‐830.	
4	Vladimir	Dedijer,	Tito	(New	York:	Simon	and	Shuster,	1953),	427.	
5	George	F.	Kennan,	“Polycentrism	and	Western	Policy,”	Foreign	Affairs	42,	No.	2	(Jan.,	1964):	170.	
6	Ibid,	175.	
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way must be the way of all countries” became apparent to other nations.7 Due to the 
threat Yugoslavia posed to the stability of the Communist bloc, Stalin endeavored to 
bring about a split in the Yugoslav Communist Party by raising the suspicion that some 
members were Stalinists; yet, this attempt was unsuccessful, going to prove that Stalin 
failed to grasp “the conditions under which” the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had 
been developed and “what had been its experiences.”8 Tito built a relationship amongst 
the Yugoslavs “in which people believe in one another and had confidence in one 
another.”9 Through polycentrism, he decentralized economic and cultural life, allowing 
the power to rest with the people. To Tito, this policy was a means of “uniting the 
citizens of a country in one Front” with the purpose being the “materialization of the 
Communist Party.”10 In essence, polycentrism was an experiment of “the American 
way—a crazy quilt of nationalities—fiercely independent, with equal rights for all 
citizens.”11 With the right kind of leadership, Tito demonstrated to the world that there 
was more than one path to socialism—that a republic as diverse as Yugoslavia could stay 
united. Yet as the Tito era came to an end, the world was in a period of great conflict. 
These conflicts foreshadowed the disintegration of Yugoslavia, for the federation’s 
success was founded in Tito’s cult of personality. Without Tito’s leadership, the 
fragmentation of Yugoslavia would prove unavoidable. 
On May 4, 1980, Josip Broz Tito died at the age of eighty-eight. Having ruled 
over Yugoslavia for nearly four decades, he left an impressive legacy. After his death, the 
																																																								
7	Dedijer,	422.	
8	Ibid,	422.	
9	Ibid,	404‐405.	
10	Ibid.	428‐429.	
11	David	Binder,	“Fare	Well	Illyria!”	(foreign	correspondent	for	the	New	York	Times),	73.		
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nation had a literacy rate of 85%, population of 21.3 million, and GDP of $26 billion.12 
But most significantly, he left behind “Titoism,” an ideology his successors would fail to 
grasp. Denying the existence of his own philosophy, Tito claimed, “We are Marxists, I 
am a Marxist and therefore I cannot be a ‘Titoist.’ …What exists in our country is 
socialism and cannot be called ‘Titoism.’”13 Nevertheless, Yugoslavia operated under 
certain unique circumstances. In Yugoslavia, the factories were “turned over to the 
workers” with the intention of providing the foundation for a “socialist democracy.”14 
Tito sought to develop a “spirit of comradeship” and “spirit of equality” among people, to 
ensure economic, social, and political freedoms for all individuals, so as to realize his 
ideal of true socialism.15 Above all, Tito’s utmost goal was to prove that Yugoslavia 
remained a Communist state, in spite of Western influence. Despite Tito’s disavowal, 
Titoism possessed inherent differences from traditional Marxism that needed to survive 
in order for the continuation of Yugoslavia’s success. After Tito’s death, three pillars 
needed to be maintained: “worker’s self-management, political nonalignment, [and] the 
federal organization of the state.”16 In 1974, Yugoslavia amended its Constitution with 
the intent of preparing for the transition between leaders. Under Tito’s direction, the 
Constitution dictated the formation of a nine-member collective presidency; six people 
would represent each of the six republics, another two would represent each of the two 
autonomous regions, and one individual would rule the party. In 1978, Tito suggested an 
amendment to the Constitution in which one member of the collective presidency would 
																																																								
12	Andrew	Borowiec,	Yugoslavia	After	Tito	(New	York:	Praeger	Publishers,	1979),	97.	
13	Dedijer,	432.	
14	Ibid,	426.	
15	Ibid,	405.	
16	Borowiec,	103.	
																																																																																																																																										Hinerfeld	
	 	
6
serve as the overarching president of Yugoslavia, serving a single one-year term.17 Upon 
Tito’s death, the collective presidency went into effect, with the amendment that 
established one predominant leader. Thus, a continuous line of men and women 
succeeded Tito. This disrupted the nation each year as a new person took office, adding 
to the instability of the federation.18 Though the intent of the proposed Constitutional 
changes was pure, the collective presidency made Yugoslavia unpredictable. Tito had 
amended the Constitution in an attempt to prevent a dictator from succeeding him, but he 
instead paved the way for economic collapse and the ascension of an ideological rival. 
Largely due to the ineffective leadership of the collective presidency, 
Yugoslavia’s economy began to collapse. After Tito’s death, two majorities evolved. One 
group believed that the nation needed to focus on stricter economic policies to improve 
the developing country, while the other group argued that Tito’s grandiose foreign policy 
needed to endure. They argued that Yugoslavia needed to continue acting as a leader in 
the Non-Alignment Movement and opposing anticommunists.19 As the government failed 
to focus on a clear direction forward, this division led to discrepancies in the allocation of 
funds. In 1974 and 1980, the nation’s budget was balanced.20 However, a combination of 
factors led to debilitating economic collapse in the years following Tito’s death. In 1982, 
Milka Planinc was elected head of the collective presidency. She wanted to lower 
inflation, which was growing at a rate of 40% annually at the time.21 Thus, the collective 
presidency enforced a policy of “full employment” to both limit inflation and attack the 
rising levels of unemployment. Meanwhile, with Tito dead, both the USSR and United 
																																																								
17	Stankovic,	105.	
18	Borowiec,	105.	
19	Stankovic,	104.	
20	Donald	F.	Graff,	“A	Quiet	Transition	in	Yugoslavia,”	The	Telegraph	(United	Kingdom),	May	28,	1982.	
21	Ibid.	
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States felt confident that Yugoslavia was no longer a major threat. In 1984, the Reagan 
administration introduced a policy in a National Security Decision Directive to target 
Yugoslavia’s economy; the United States sought to topple Communist Nations, forcing 
Eastern Europe to participate in a market-oriented economy.22 Western trade barriers 
halted economic growth in Yugoslavia, forcing the government to take out International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) loans. In 1982, the federation’s foreign debt reached 16.9 billion in 
US dollars.  By 1988, the foreign debt topped twenty-one billion in US dollars with a 
217% inflation increase.23 
While ineffective leadership and economic collapse were highly detrimental to 
post-Tito Yugoslavia, ethnic conflicts became the federation’s true downfall. Slobodan 
Milosevic, an ideological rival of Tito’s, proved to be the primary instigator of these 
clashes. In the late 1980s, Milosevic was garnering support for himself in Serbia. Without 
Tito, Communism was failing in Eastern Europe; Milosevic proposed a different style of 
rule, advocating for “incendiary Nationalism.”24 To his good fortune, Milosevic was 
close friends with Ivan Stambolic, a man with high standing in Tito’s Yugoslav 
Communist Party. In the 1980s, Stambolic was elected President of the Republic of 
Serbia. In a thirty-hour meeting that spanned from September 23 to September 24, 1987, 
Milosevic engineered President Stambolic’s ouster, effectively taking over Serbia. From 
that moment on, he declared Serbia to be “Communist by name and Nationalist by 
																																																								
22	Sean	Gervasi,	“Germany,	the	US,	and	the	Yugoslav	Crisis,”	Covert	Action	43,	(Winter	1992‐1993):	
42‐43.	
23Henry	Kamm,	“Yugoslavia’s	President	Says	Crisis	Harms	the	Country’s	Reputation,”	The	New	York	
Times,	Oct.	19,	1988.	
24	Marlise	Simons	and	Alison	Smale,	“Slobodan	Milosevic,	64,	Former	Yugoslav	Leader	Accused	of	
War	Crimes,	Dies,”	The	New	York	Times,	Mar.	12,	2006.	
																																																																																																																																										Hinerfeld	
	 	
8
choice.”25 After becoming President of Serbia in 1987, Milosevic began to exert authority 
over Yugoslavia, encouraging nationalistic tendencies. Back in 1981—one year after 
Tito’s death—ethnic Albanians held riots in Kosovo, rebelling against Yugoslav rule.26 In 
Tito’s time, these conflicts were quashed; however, the Serbian president deliberately 
resurrected these nationalistic grudges. When Milosevic took power, the two largest 
ethnic groups of Yugoslavia were Roman Catholic Croats and Orthodox Christian Serbs. 
Conscious of this fact, Milosevic used nationalism to set the stage for a brutal civil war 
that spread across the federation. He orchestrated wars that pitted the Serbs against 
Slovenes, Croats, Albanians, Kosovars, and Bosnians, all with the intention of realizing 
his dream of a “Greater Serbia.”27 As a result of a practice called “ethnic cleansing,” 
millions of people were killed or displaced during the conflicts with the Serbs. The war in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina alone resulted in two hundred thousand deaths and left millions 
of people without homes. Both in 1991 and 1996, opposition forces attempted to oust 
Milosevic. They finally succeeded in 2000. In 2001, Milosevic was sent to The Hague to 
be charged with war crimes; he was discovered dead in his cell in 2006. Slobodan 
Milosevic left a dark legacy: Serbian Nationalism served as a key part of inciting ethnic 
conflicts in Yugoslavia. Thus, the disintegration of Yugoslavia was largely his fault.  
Spurred on by Milosevic’s Serbian forces, Yugoslavia gradually began to 
fragment. As experts had predicted, “serious ethnic conflicts” served as “the principal 
difficulty for Tito’s successors” and were a major contributor to this phenomenon.28 By 
1992, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was in ruins. Slobodan Milosevic’s 
																																																								
25	Ibid.	
26	William	Rees‐Mogg,	“Slobodan	Milosevic,	64,	Former	Yugoslav	Leader	Accused	of	War	Crimes,	
Dies,”	The	Times	(London,	England),	Apr.	17,	1981.	
27	Simons	and	Smale.	
28	Stankovic,	113.	
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goal of replacing Communism with Nationalism had succeeded. Slovenia and Croatia 
were the first to secede in 1991, with Macedonia following shortly thereafter. The 
following year, Bosnia Herzegovina also declared its independence. In order to resolve 
longstanding ethnic conflicts in Bosnia, the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995 created 
two self-governing entities within the nation, dividing the Serbs and Muslim-Croats. 
After the secession of Bosnia Herzegovina, only Serbia and Montenegro remained in the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, now calling itself the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. Due to the years of turmoil in the federation, the international community 
refused to recognize the new republic. Thus, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia divided 
into successor states in 2003.   
In the span of eighty-five years, Yugoslavia managed to rise to the status of  
world power in control of the majority of Eastern Europe and to completely fall out of 
power, ultimately disappearing off the map. For thirty-seven years, the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia thrived under Josip Broz Tito’s leadership. He unified the diverse 
nation, growing both an educated population as well as growing a healthy and robust 
economy. Significant for his cult of personality, Tito introduced policies of ‘non-
alignment’ and ‘polycentrism,’ which revolutionized the nature of a Communist 
government. Upon Tito’s death in 1980, marred by the unproductive leadership of a nine-
member collective presidency and riddled with foreign debt, Yugoslavia started to 
dissolve. When Slobodan Milosevic was elected President of Serbia in 1987, all hopes for 
Yugoslavia maintaining a Communist style of government was lost. Through widespread 
‘ethnic cleansing,’ Milosevic coordinated the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. 
During Milosevic’s rule, Yugoslavia’s various republics began to declare their 
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independence. All that Tito had worked for, all that he had strived to create, was lost. 
Nevertheless, his legacy as a benevolent dictator will not be forgotten. Tito demonstrated 
to the world the importance of respecting different cultures and the inherent power of 
neutrality. He developed a new archetype for a leader, one who above all values the input 
of the masses, as opposed to the input of the elite. On the idolatry of leaders, Tito once 
said, “If a man separates himself from the people, if he tends to be set on a pedestal, then 
he will only inspire fear or hatred…the people are those who are the motive power, they 
are the ones who inspire their leaders and the leader is but the organizer and the 
formulator of the people’s thoughts.”29 Although Yugoslavia no longer exists, Tito, 
leader of the republic for nearly half of its existence, will serve as a role model for 
centuries to come. 
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